First, he didn't call the "crash()" function, he called the "unwrap()" function. The fact that they decided to call the crash function "unwrap()" is not the OP's fault, it's the language authors' fault.
Second, you totally missed the OP's point about reliability. If one has to choose between UB and an immediate halt, those are pretty sucky options. And the OP is 100% right about Rust crashing all the time. Nothing insulting about that, just a fact.
You get to choose between UB, a crash, or handling the error — same as most other languages.
It’s not a reliability issue of the language if as an author of software you choose to crash in your failure handling cases. Claiming otherwise is either disingenuous or a failure to understand what actually happened.
No, it's not the "same as most other languages". C and C++ are actually the only mainstream languages that suffer from UB to this extent.
The fact that, in practice, with Rust you get a crash instead of UB is 100% a reliability issue with the language. The crashes are inbuilt. And blaming the crash on the author, saying they "chose to crash", is exactly the same as blaming UB on the author of C code, saying they "chose to double-free".
> The fact that, in practice, with Rust you get a crash instead of UB is 100% a reliability issue with the language. The crashes are inbuilt.
This is totally false. It's not in the least hard to avoid crashing.
match some_result {
Ok(value) => { // handle the value },
Err(e) => { // handle the error condition }
}
The fact that Cloudflare chose to handle a result with the "panic if this result is an error" function is 100% on them, not on the language. Blaming the language is like claiming that any language which has assert is a problem because the assert can crash your program. Yes, that's what it's there for, so don't use it if that isn't what you want.
And don't give me the "the method name isn't obvious enough" argument you used elsewhere. That holds no water. It's basic Rust knowledge to know that "unwrap" will panic if the value is an error (or None if it's optional). If the engineers writing the code didn't know that, then the problem is they didn't bother to learn how their tools work, which again is not the language's fault.
What UB? This has nothing to do with UB; it'd be well-defined in any language. It's equivalent to this python snippet:
config = load_config()
if !config.valid():
sys.exit(1) # config is corrupt. restart pod
Did Python do something wrong by letting users call `sys.exit`? No. This is a deliberate crash. Under other circumstances, crashing might have been a valid strategy, but here it turned out to be a bad choice, since Cloudflare's infrastructure was restarting the service with the same bad config every time.
Sys exit does not crash. It raises a SystemExit exception, which can be caught on any layer above it. Given that python uses exceptions for trivial things like loop termination this can be considered normal flow control.
If I could choose between UB and a crash I will chose the crash every time. The sooner the better, preferably in test. And that's where CF's real failure was.
I suspect you're reading into my comment more than what I intended to say.
In the context of fine-tuning arguments for God, we really are just arguing that an intelligent designer designed the universe. In isolation, this doesn't necessarily commit us to some mainstream religion, and in this context, God is just the intelligent designer of the universe, nothing more (though proponents of the arguments will go on, through other arguments, to ascribe more properties to this thing).
>Goddidit is not an explanation.
I don't know why it wouldn't be. Suppose I kept pulling a card from a deck and showing it to you. Every single time, it was the ace of spades. Why is this? Well, one pretty good explanation is that I know where the ace of spades is in the deck and I'm intentionally picking that card out and showing it to you. That is, there is intelligence/intentionality that explains this event. You would probably consider this as an explanation. The fine-tuning argument's conclusion is just as much of an explanation.
>Nope, not like any other answer. Like Satandidit.
I don't know what you mean to say here. Satandidit doesn't predict anything either.
>No, not like other answers. Science never closes the book on further questions.
This isn't a scientific question though. This is a question about why the fundamental constants of nature are what they are. This is a question beyond the domain of science. Elsewhere in this thread, someone linked a video of Feynman (an atheist) on "why" questions and how at some point they have to bottom out - and at this point, science cannot provide the answers.
Besides, this doesn't close the book on further questions. We can still ask, "what kind of existence is this intelligent designer?", "why does this intelligent designer exist?", etc. And of course, questions that are normally under the domain of science are still under the domain of science.
I consider the person to whom you are responding a troll, because they are taking a hard line stance, using abrupt terms, shutting down discussion, and putting much less effort into things than you are.
That said, I agree with you roughly. I think suggesting an intelligent design as a possibility is not "shutting down curiosity". A scientific mind can entertain higher forms of power and look into it.
Accepting the possibility of a creator is not equivalent to blind devotion to one of the many existing faiths.
That's quite rich, coming from somebody who took a hard line stance, used an abrupt term, put very little effort in and shut down the discussion by calling me a "troll."
That said, intelligent design is shutting down curiosity. It's not an explanation for anything, it's not a falsifiable theory, and posits a supreme being that we can't possibly have any hope of ever understanding, as it is incalculably more intelligent and complex, thereby eliminating the need and desire for further research. The only way to accept it is to have "faith," not through reasoning. Intelligent design is basically goddidit dressed up in scientific jargon, incompetently so.
The fact that every single proponent of it, ever, was a religious person first, and then became an intellectual promoting intelligent design, and that no scientist who wasn't a believer first was ever convinced by the intelligent design argumentation, should tell you enough. But if that's not sufficient, there have actually been court cases in the U.S. where people tried to get it into schools on the basis that it's a scientific argument. Every time they failed, with the courts ruling that it's quack science that doesn't merit consideration. For the latest example, look up Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District.
Again, I think you've brought a lot of baggage with you in reading this discussion. The conclusion of the fine-tuning argument [0] is different from intelligent design theory [1]. The fine-tuning argument only posits that the reason that the laws and constants of nature are what they are because of an intelligent designer. It does not posit that evolutionary theory is incorrect. That would be intelligent design theory, which is an entirely separate and distinct idea.
They are both goddidit, just dressed up differently (slightly so).
There is no baggage. You were trying to sell goddidit here as an "explanation" that should merit the same consideration as actual scientific theories, and deserved to be called out on it.
"Goddidit" is supposed to, I take it, refer to saying something like: "We don't know how to explain this. Thus, God did it." The fine-tuning argument isn't the same. The fine-tuning argument says, "We know that the universal constants, had they been slightly different, would not have allowed for a universe in which life was possible. The probability that these constants are what they are by random chance is very low---so much so that the probability that these constants are what they are by random chance seems to be much lower than the probability that these constants were chosen intelligently. Thus, we should believe these constants were in fact chosen intelligently, which implies a designer of the universe." It explains why the low-probability event of these constants being what they are occurred. You can have objections to the argument, that's fine, but it's an explanation nonetheless. And it has the same predictive power---that is, none---and leaves the door open for further inquiry just as much as the other explanations (e.g. "It's a coincidence" or "There's a multiverse" or "Of course it's this way, otherwise we wouldn't have been around to observe it").
It does not explain why the low-probability event of these constants being what they are occurred. It does not explain anything. All it does is move the goalpost for explaining beyond unreachable and trap the inquisitive mind in a box.
As to the predictive power, the multiverse theory does have it. The fact that we can't experimentally confirm it today doesn't mean that it's not falsifiable. I agree, however, that the anthropic principle does not have a predictive power, just like fine tuning, but at least the anthropic principle doesn't imprison the mind and stunt further research by positing an unexplainable super being.
Again, just like with intelligent design, there is not a single physicist who was an atheist first, and then learned about fine tuning and became a believer. Every single proponent of fine tuning was a person of faith first (predominantly Christian but some other faiths too) before they became a physicist. Can you name a single counter example? (that might make me reconsider)
>It does not explain why the low-probability event of these constants being what they are occurred. It does not explain anything.
Maybe you could explain (no pun intended) why it's not an explanation? Go back to the card example I used earlier - would you agree that me intentionally arranging the events is an explanation? What exactly is it that makes this an explanation, but not an intelligence behind universal constants (I won't use the word God so as to not offend you---again, the idea that there is an intelligence behind universal constants doesn't commit us to any particular faith, doesn't commit us to the idea that the intelligence must be the ultimate cause or omnipotent or omniscient or anything like that)?
>All it does is move the goalpost for explaining beyond unreachable and trap the inquisitive mind in a box.
What box-trapping are you referring to here? If by moving the goalpost, you mean that it doesn't explain anything about why the intelligence is what it is or how it behaves---yes, indeed, it doesn't, and we're still open to asking these questions. Again, we're not committing to any particular faith here, you could even use this argument to provide credence for the simulation hypothesis (something you're probably fine with since it's not a strictly theistic idea), since we're not saying anything particular about what this intelligence is like or how it came to be. In the context of the argument, we say "God" to just mean "intelligence behind the universe".
>As to the predictive power, the multiverse theory does have it. The fact that we can't experimentally confirm it today doesn't mean that it's not falsifiable.
Oh, interesting, what are you referring to here? What could empirically falsify the multiverse theory?
>Again, just like with intelligent design, there is not a single physicist who was an atheist first, and then learned about fine tuning and became a believer. Every single proponent of fine tuning was a person of faith first (predominantly Christian but some other faiths too) before they became a physicist. Can you name a single counter example? (that might make me reconsider)
I don't see why the behavior of people who accept or reject the argument is relevant. We don't reject intelligent design because it's pushed by Christians; we reject it because it appears to be inferior in terms of explanatory power and utility for scientists. (Of course, intelligent design is still an explanation; another key point here is that there's a difference between a false or bad explanation and a not-even-explanation---off the top of my head, I can't even think of what a not-even-explanation that purports to be an explanation looks like.)
In your card example, the theory that posits that you picked the cards intentionally is something that can be subjected to scientific scrutiny. We are allowed to ask where you came from, what caused you to form the intent, and then prove or disprove such claims.
No such inquiry is allowed with fine tuning, because it's designed to terminate the scientific probing. The designer is beyond understanding by definition. You say that fine tuning proponents are still "open" to figuring out why or what this intelligent designer is, but unless you can provide an example of a reputable physicist actually working on this, it's a false claim. If there is such a poor soul out there, they are working on a sisyphus task, hoping beyond hope to understand the supreme being that made the universe.
First we were supposed to believe that the earth was flat, because that's how God made it. Then when that was disproven, we were supposed to believe that it was round, but that it was made 6000 years ago, in 6 days. Then when that was disproven, we were supposed to believe that maybe it was older but it was the center of the universe. Then when that was disproven we were supposed to believe that maybe it revolved around the sun, but that God made us in his image. Then when that was disproven we are supposed to believe that evolution did happen, but only because God willed it by fine tuning the universe. With each new claim, religion moves the goal post further and further beyond the reach of contemporary science, but they are all designed to trap the mind within religious bounds, where once you get to God you are not allowed to ask any more questions. Look up Hegelian dialectics for a fascinating example of this. Fine tuning is but the latest example.
The reason why the behavior of people accepting the argument is important is because with an unfalsiable claim like fine tuning, if you're not patient enough to wait hundreds of years for physics to figure it out, one of the few things you're left with is appeal to authority. If you can trace the claim back to a bunch of religious quacks who otherwise never made meaningful contributions to science, you may decide that it's not worth your time. (I am obviously not talking about people who found evidence of fine tuning, but about people who then use that as evidence of a supposed intelligence).
>The designer is beyond understanding by definition.
Where in the argument is the designer defined this way?
The argument is, roughly speaking:
(1) The fine-tuning of universal constants is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
(2) It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
(3) Therefore, it is due to design.
>You say that fine tuning proponents are still "open" to figuring out why or what this intelligent designer is, but unless you can provide an example of a reputable physicist actually working on this, it's a false claim.
I said that the fine-tuning argument does not commit you to not asking further questions. Fine-tuning proponents generally aren't just using the fine-tuning argument in isolation but rather to support a particular set of views. But if there's something problematic here, it would seem to be not the fine-tuning argument but other arguments or views these people have.
Besides, the questions of "where you came from" and "what caused you to form the intent" are in the scope of theology, and there is a diversity of views in the exact answers to these questions and arguments for/against them. Of course, this isn't a science, but that's because the designer explanation for fine-tuning is not a scientific explanation, just as the anthropic principle explanation for fine-tuning is not a scientific explanation. You can reject these explanations as bad ones, that's fine, but not being scientific just makes them not-scientific explanations. Not being good explanations makes them not-good explanations. It doesn't make them not-explanations.
>Here is one physicist explaining how to falsify one version of the multiverse theory
As I understand it, the Many-World Interpretation is just related to interpreting the collapse of the wave function in quantum mechanics---the other worlds in this interpretation don't have different universal constants or laws of physics; rather, the different possibilities that quantum mechanics allows for are all realized in different worlds.
Anyway, Carroll goes on to say that it's falsifiable, but it seems he only means falsifiable in the sense that quantum mechanics is falsifiable (obviously falsifying quantum mechanics falsifies interpretations of it), which is why he notes different interpretations which are experimentally indistinguishable. The issue is that this interpretation is not falsifiable with respect to other interpretations, which Carroll admits himself. But this is likely neither here nor there since MWI isn't the same as the multiverse response to fine-tuning, but maybe you can correct me.
In discussing the multiverse, Carroll himself has an interesting paper [0] on the multiverse and how its lack of falsifiability is fine. Indeed, he's quite on-point here, falsifiability is not really all it's cracked up to be as the field of philosophy of science has shown after Popper's formulation of it. Still, unfalsifiable.
So to be sure, my original point was that the fine-tuning argument for a designer is still an explanation (even if it's a non-scientific one or poor one) and has just as much predictive power as other hypotheses (none). It also doesn't close the door to any further questions any more than the other responses to fine-tuning---it might move them to the realm of metaphysical questions rather than scientific ones (and even if scientific, not empirically falsifiable or confirmable), but the door is open. Maybe theists will go on to close that door for a variety of reasons, but the fault doesn't seem to lie with the fine-tuning argument itself.
>If you can trace the claim back to a bunch of religious quacks who otherwise never made meaningful contributions to science
"This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being." - Isaac Newton, in the appendix of his Principia, apparently!
>one of the few things you're left with is appeal to authority.
I don't see why we need to resort to appeal to authority when we can make grounded criticisms of the fine-tuning argument. For example, why should we believe that the universal constants being what they are has a low probability, as if they were pulled from some probability distribution? That is, we can simply reject premise 2 of the argument as I outlined above.
The point is not that it's the greatest argument, but just that it's an explanation, not just meaningless drivel (like "because pixel cooked the music") as you were suggesting. And it has comparable (zero) predictive power to other hypotheses.
I don't think this is relevant to the fine-tuning argument itself, but I'll respond to it anyway:
>First we were supposed to believe that the earth was flat, because that's how God made it.
This has never been a popular view among theologians or the church in the history of Christianity. The Aristotelian/Ptolemaic model (Aristotle, of course, not being Christian and writing centuries before the birth of Christ) seems to have been the dominant view until a bit after Galileo.
>in 6 days
We have discussion of this account in Genesis being allegorical among the early Church Fathers, very early in the history of Christianity.
>Then when that was disproven, we were supposed to believe that maybe it was older but it was the center of the universe. Then when that was disproven we were supposed to believe that maybe it revolved around the sun
We don't owe geocentrism to Christian thought but rather to the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic model. And geocentrism was on firm scientific ground at the time - astronomic tables in the Ptolemaic system and in the Copernican system had roughly the same magnitude of error. And the Ptolemaic system did not have the issue of not being able to explain why things on Earth did not move as if the Earth was moving - a problem that was only really solved until Newtownian physics, if I recall.
And the Copernican views weren't really problematic for the Church themselves, it seems that rabble-rousing by Giordano Bruno and Galileo was the real culprit for getting Copernicus's book banned. The Pope even gave Galileo a chance to express his views in the form of a dialogue, but Galileo didn't exactly give the other side a fair portrayal in this dialogue (calling the geocentrism-supporting character "Simplicio" and having him act like a fool).
Basically, it's just not true that geocentrism was church dogma held on religious grounds and refuted through science, at which point it was dropped---the history is more nuanced.
>God made us in his image
This is still held by Christians today and is not incompatible with evolution. Though yes, Christians certainly did not believe in evolution before Darwin.
>where once you get to God you are not allowed to ask any more questions
But we have a long history of Christianity being dominant among scientists asking questions about the natural world (and the intelligibility of the physical world is an idea very much in line with Christian thought). You talked about creationism - it was in fact a theist who formulated the theory of the Big Bang.
And indeed, theology is filled with questions about the nature of God and how to understand God's relationship with the world. See for example Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, which is nothing more than a list of questions and answers along with possible objections about reason, faith, God, and theology. Not a scientific work of course, but the point is you are certainly allowed to ask more questions.
>Hegelian dialectics
I don't see how Hegelian dialectics is an example of not being able to ask questions once you get to God? Or perhaps you mean that the supposed history of tension between religion and science you outlined is an example of Hegelian dialectics. I am not a Hegel scholar, but I thought dialectical tension is a good thing, not a bad thing?
>Where in the argument is the designer defined this way?
The argument is, roughly speaking:
(1) The fine-tuning of universal constants is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design. (2) It is not due to physical necessity or chance. (3) Therefore, it is due to design.
Ok, let me try and help you here.
In the argument, the designer is defined as beyond understanding right here:
"(3) Therefore, it is due to design."
Still having trouble seeing it? Let me try and help a little more. It's here:
"(3) THEREFORE, IT IS DUE TO DESIGN."
Do you see how absurd it would be for you to propose that this "design" came about on its own, or by chance? How that would put you right back on square one, exposing fine tuning as the mindless drivel that it is? Do you see how comical it would be of you to suggest that you have all the mysteries of this universe figured out and you are now ready to take on the challenge of figuring out its designer, or even more comically, that you have barely even begun understanding the universe you're in but you're "open" to leapfrogging right into figuring out the thing that designed it? Where else are you going to take this? The simulation hypothesis? As if the dude that built the simulator can be any less complicated than the dude that fine-tuned everything?
Let's resolve this disagreement before tackling the other issues you raise in your response. Do you still have trouble understanding where in the argument the designer is defined this way?
Yes, I still have trouble where "beyond understanding" is in (3). One reason I'm having trouble is because theologians, for example, have made arguments about ascribing various properties about the designer, e.g. that the designer is omnipotent, spaceless, timeless, etc. This shouldn't be possible even in principle if the designer is beyond understanding by definition, just like it's impossible to make coherent arguments that a triangle does not have three sides. You've suggested that it seems silly to be able to understand anything beyond the physical universe accessible to us when we don't yet have a full understanding of it, but "it seems silly" seems to be different from "it follows by definition". And in any case, the multiverse hypothesis is an attempt to understand something beyond the physical universe accessible to us, but presumably you wouldn't leverage this same objection against it.
If you really mean "beyond empirical inquiry", I would be inclined to agree, though I don't know how other explanations for the fine-tuning of the universe are better in this respect.
Ahh, theologians have made various claims about the designer? The same people that claim that he showed up as a burning bush one day, and as his own son the next?
Theologians have made many garbage assertions throughout centuries. Just because something is self-contradictory, paradoxical or nonsensical does not mean that a human hand can't put it down on paper. Here, watch this:
"A triangle does not have three sides. To find out why, and to get saved, come to the service on Sunday! (don't forget the donation)"
Other than theologians and their quackery, is there anything else that troubles you with regards to the assertion that the designer must be complex beyond understanding?
Furthermore, were you not trying to divorce religion from fine tuning? Are you finding that a little difficult? Do you see irony in the fact that you dragged it back into the dialogue all the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own?
These aren't the kind of assertions I'm referring to though---I'm referring to arguments whose conclusions follow logically from their premises, the kind you can't make about triangles not having three sides because you end up in logical contradictions. If you don't like theologians, go back to Aristotle and his arguments about, for example, the unmoved mover. I mention theologians because they are the ones most often in the business of making arguments about this subject. Of course, you still needn't buy into any religion or theology in going about this project of understanding the designer. Just one example: you might raise the famous problem of evil to claim that the designer cannot be all-good---that's a kind of understanding.
In an attempt to refute the point about the designer being beyond understanding, you appealed to religion, all the while claiming that you don't have to appeal to religion.
Then you claim that one can't make a kind of an argument that I just demonstrated one can make.
Now you bring the problem of evil into the dialogue, as if that somehow brings the designer within reach of our understanding, when if anything it moves the concept even further beyond our reach.
Not to mention that with the problem of evil, you're dragging morality into this, another framework of thought just like religion, and closely coupled with it, that science does not deal with or recognize. All the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own.
You brought up a bunch of very interesting points in one of your previous posts that I would love to respond to, and I have enjoyed the discussion thus far, but I feel like it would be pointless to engage further unless you can clean up and strengthen your argumentation with regards to understanding the designer, so that it's free of contradictions and self-refutations. Or at least demonstrate willingness to concede a point.
What I said is that the fine-tuning argument does not commit you to any particular religion. In demonstrating how we can understand the designer, I gave theological arguments about God as an example.
Buying some of the theological arguments about God, even if they are employed by theists, still does not commit you to a particular religion. You can agree to the omnipotence and omnipresence of the designer but not its moral interest in the good of humanity, for example. See Spinoza's Ethics for an example of a thinker who subscribes to this and fleshes out an entire system with this in mind. (There might be some controversy on this point, but Spinoza scholar Steven Nadler calls Spinoza an atheist. It's not a stretch to say that you could agree to all the arguments made in Ethics but still not subscribe to any religion.) And of course, as I said in the last comment, you can still go to Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover as an example of a thinker who predated Christianity and had no affiliation with any traditional monotheistic religion. The point is that we need not commit to any religion but can still make arguments about certain properties of the designer.
>Now you bring the problem of evil into the dialogue, as if that somehow brings the designer within reach of our understanding, when if anything it moves the concept even further beyond our reach.
>Not to mention that with the problem of evil, you're dragging morality into this, another framework of thought just like religion, and closely coupled with it, that science does not deal with or recognize. All the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own.
I only introduced the problem of evil so I could give a pithy description of an argument we can make that clearly does not commit us to any mainstream religion but still reveals something to us about the nature of the designer. This is just one clear example of how we could come to understand something about the designer, if you buy the argument.
But maybe this is the crux of the contention you're having with me - implicit in what you've just said is that when you say understanding, you only mean scientific understanding, and likely that when you say explanation, you only mean scientific explanation. As I said before, the fine-tuning argument does indeed move us out of the realm of science and into metaphysics. So the sense in which we can understand or explain things about the designer is no longer scientific, but metaphysical. But that's fine - understanding need not be scientific understanding, and explanations need not be scientific explanations.
Just to elucidate what exactly I've been defending:
The fine-tuning argument does not commit us to a particular religion (we can easily imagine that there is a designer but that no religion is true). It offers an explanation of why the universal constants are what they are (by design as opposed to chance or necessity). It does not shut down further discussion - we can still ask questions about the nature of the designer (see paragraphs 2 and 4 of this comment). The design theory has no predictive power, yes, just like how other explanations of why the universal constants are what they are have no predictive power.
First you repeat the claim that fine tuning does not commit you to a religion, and then you keep appealing to religion all the way throughout. That's self-refutation at its finest.
You can stop saying "any particular religion" and just say "religion." I do accept that although fine tuning is almost exclusively pushed by Christian quacks, other religions can push it too. It also seems to be a bit of a straw-man, as I never asserted that it commits you to a specific religion, or to religion for that matter. You inevitably have to come back to it, as there is nowhere else you can take this nonsense, as you have aptly demonstrated, but you don't have to "commit" to it at the onset.
Then you comically bring up Spinoza, seemingly to strengthen your "any particular religion" point, but perhaps without realizing that he undermines your "understanding the designer" point. And you acknowledge literally in the same paragraph that he might have been an atheist. And not only that, but his concept of God, such as it is, is totally incompatible with fine tuning, because he doesn't even ascribe it intelligence. And not just that, but Spinoza ascribes quite meager power to the human mind, even denying us free will. So much for "understanding the designer" with Spinoza. Another self-refutation.
Then you even more comically bring up Aristotle, claiming that he has "no affiliation with any traditional religion," perhaps without realizing that Aristotle has become a staple in Christian theology from St. Aquinas onward. And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension. Another self-refutation.
Then you repeat your point about the problem of evil, without adding anything new, although it's already been refuted. The problem of evil does not help you come to understand something about the designer. All it does is weaken the ontological argument, and other arguments that depend on benevolence, and brings into question free will in both the designer and the human mind, without moving the needle one bit on any of the other issues that you have to content with in a benevolent designer.
Then you concede that fine tuning does indeed move us out of science, when earlier you were trying to demonstrate that it doesn't by citing the Elon Musk simulation joke meme. Nice.
I appreciate you clarifying the language on "understanding." Of course there is no such thing as scientific understanding of the designer, as science doesn't even recognize the concept (thank God, pun intended.) I thought you were the one trying to stay within science because you kept saying that you don't have to commit to religion, and citing things like the simulation hypothesis. When I say that the designer is beyond understanding, I mean primarily in the religious and metaphysical sense. In religion, his ways are mysterious. In metaphysics, he is all-knowing while the human mind is constrained and limited to our senses. That said, I would have accepted it if you were able to somehow demonstrate that there can be a scientific understanding of this concept, but it's now clear that that's not happening.
Also when I say "understanding" I obviously don't mean ascribing it paradoxical and otherwise nonsensical attributes the way I can assert right now that it has three eyes and a four-sided triangle for a mouth. When I say "understanding" I mean understanding why and what this designer is, as you put it earlier. I mean understanding how it came to be this way; to be able to go around fine-tuning things?
In your last paragraph you seem to want to broaden the scope of the dialogue without having refuted or conceded the point on understanding the designer, but we're going to have to stick to that until it's resolved, because it's kinda important. So here is the simple assertion you need to either refute or concede:
"Fine tuning posits a designer that is beyond human capacity to understand."
>First you repeat the claim that fine tuning does not commit you to a religion, and then you keep appealing to religion all the way throughout. That's self-refutation at its finest.
I don't understand? Maybe you can read my previous comment more carefully? I've mentioned Aristotle and Spinoza as more clear examples of thinkers who have thought about the designer and whose arguments, if you accept them, will still not commit you to any religion. I've also given a simple example related to the problem of evil of an argument that reveals something about the designer that does not commit you to any religion. I think it's clear at this point that fine-tuning does not commit you to a religion, and apparently you agree.
>Then you comically bring up Spinoza, seemingly to strengthen your "any particular religion" point, but perhaps without realizing that he undermines your "understanding the designer" point. And you acknowledge literally in the same paragraph that he might have been an atheist.
I don't understand? Atheism is not a religion. That he can be interpreted as an atheist implies that his arguments about the cause of reality (who you might argue is the same as the designer posited in the fine-tuning argument) shows that the positing of a designer and going on to ascribe properties to the designer via arguments can still keep you as an atheist, not a religious person.
>And not only that, but his concept of God, such as it is, is totally incompatible with fine tuning, because he doesn't even ascribe it intelligence.
Spinoza ascribes an intellect to God and describes God as a thinking thing.
>Spinoza ascribes quite meager power to the human mind
He proves many things about God in Ethics, proofs which are a result of the human mind.
>Then you even more comically bring up Aristotle, claiming that he has "no affiliation with any traditional religion," perhaps without realizing that Aristotle has become a staple in Christian theology from St. Aquinas onward. And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension. Another self-refutation.
Aristotle has no affiliation with any traditional religion in the sense that he was not Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc., and wouldn't have recognized these religions (not the least because the first two didn't exist during his time).
> And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension.
Aristotle discusses the unmoved mover philosophically and makes arguments about the kind of being it is, for example, that it has no potentiality.
>The problem of evil does not help you come to understand something about the designer. All it does is weaken the ontological argument, and other arguments that depend on benevolence, and brings into question free will in both the designer and the human mind, without moving the needle one bit on any of the other issues that you have to content with in a benevolent designer.
The problem of evil is something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all-good. It gets you to knowledge of the absence of a particular property of the designer. I don't know why this wouldn't be a form of understanding.
>When you concede that fine tuning does indeed move us out of science, when earlier you were trying to demonstrate that it doesn't by citing the Elon Musk simulation joke meme. Nice.
I don't know where I've said that understanding the designer is something we can do scientifically, or where I've implied that the fine-tuning argument does not move us out of science, maybe you can quote me to remind me. I don't take the simulation hypothesis very seriously either, but some people do (see Nick Bostrom), and it is something you might go to if you agree to the conclusion that the universal constants are what they are because of design.
>I thought you were the one trying to stay within science because you kept saying that you don't have to commit to religion
I don't think that religious understanding and scientific understanding exhaust the kinds of understanding we can have. The kind of understanding that's relevant here that is neither of these two things is metaphysical understanding. So not requiring a commitment to religion is not the same thing as being scientific here.
>When I say that the designer is beyond understanding, I mean primarily in the religious and metaphysical sense. In religion, his ways are mysterious. In metaphysics, he is all-knowing while the human mind is constrained and limited to our senses.
I don't understand what the designer being all-knowing in contrast to the human intellect being constrained has to do with the designer being beyond understanding. Again, go back to Aristotle or Spinoza's arguments for examples of ways one can come to ascribe properties to the designer (hence, understand aspects of the designer) without committing to religion.
Maybe I'll guess at what the confusion might be here - I read "not being beyond understanding" not to mean "having a full understanding". For example, the natural world is not beyond understanding (science has allowed us to gain knowledge of various things about the natural world), but it is not something we have a full understanding of---and it perhaps may not be something we ever have a full understanding of. But I, and I suspect almost everyone, would not say the natural world is beyond understanding even if it is something we will never have a full understanding of. One might argue the finitude of human intellect means we cannot come to a full understanding of God, but this says nothing about whether we can understanding some things about God.
>That said, I would have accepted it if you were able to somehow demonstrate that there can be a scientific understanding of this concept, but it's now clear that that's not happening.
I believe I said as much earlier, but I'm sorry if I've miscommunicated that.
>Also when I say "understanding" I obviously don't mean ascribing it paradoxical and otherwise nonsensical attributes the way I can assert right now that it has three eyes and a four-sided triangle for a mouth. When I say "understanding" I mean understanding why and what this designer is, as you put it earlier. I mean understanding how it came to be this way; to be able to go around fine-tuning things?
Yes, I don't mean ascribing it contradictory attributes either, and I don't think I've said anything like this. I mean ascribing it attributes like being all-good or not being all-good. Or being a thinking thing, being an extended thing, etc. See Spinoza's Ethics for a very clear example of arguing for particular attributes (he uses the same language) belonging to God, who you might argue is the designer.
>In your last paragraph you seem to want to broaden the scope of the dialogue without having refuted or conceded the point on understanding the designer, but we're going to have to stick to that until it's resolved, because it's kinda important.
I just want to make it clear what I've been saying, so that we don't get confused and start thinking that I'm saying things that I'm not, e.g. that understanding the designer is within the scope of science.
>So here is the simple assertion you need to either refute or concede:
I think I've already said much more than needed to explain why the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyond understanding, but I'll summarize it again: There are arguments that, if you buy them, lead you to knowledge of particular properties of the designer.
And just so we don't miss the forest for the trees here, that the designer is not beyond understanding is important because it is still something we can inquire about---it does not shut down further discussion about the topic. Go back to the thinkers I've mentioned so far for examples of inquiry into the kind of existence the designer is.
Really? You didn't understand me? That's weird, seeing as you claim to be able to understand none other than God. Contradiction
>I've mentioned Aristotle and Spinoza as more clear examples of thinkers who have thought about the designer
Those two have done no such thing. Their concepts of God are incompatible with the designer. One is non-intelligent, and the other is indifferent. False claim
>I think it's clear at this point that fine-tuning does not commit you to a religion, and apparently you agree.
I neither agree nor disagree. I haven't taken a position on it yet as I think it's irrelevant to the argument of understanding the designer. Religion will come up when and if we ever bubble back up from this question of understanding the designer. Non sequitur
>I don't understand?
Oops... Here is this powerful mind that can understand God, not understanding some text on the internet again. How is it possible that a bunch of words is beyond your understanding, but the thing that fine tuned the thing that caused the thing that made the words come together is not beyond your understanding? Could it be that the words are imperfect, but God is perfect and free of contradictions? In which case how do you know this? Or did you mean that God is within human understanding, just not within yours? We just need to find somebody with a big enough brain? Or do you want to redefine "understanding" yet again, to whatever fits your current mid-sentence point? Contradiction
>Atheism is not a religion. That he can be interpreted as an atheist...
Ok... Atheism not a religion... Got it... Gonna interpret Spinoza as an atheist for this argument... Got it... Let's pin this.
>the positing of a designer and going on to ascribe properties to the designer via arguments can still keep you as an atheist
No it can't. Spinoza did not posit a designer, and positing a designer makes you a non-atheist, by definition. Not that this has anything to do with understanding such a designer. False claim
>Spinoza ascribes an intellect to God and describes God as a thinking thing.
Hey, remember that thing we pinned? Here is your atheist, acting like a theist. Contradiction
Also, Spinoza's idea of the intellect that you reference is incompatible with the intelligence required for the fine tuner. Non sequitur
>He proves many things about God in Ethics
Here is that guy you interpreted as an atheist going on and on about God, yet again... Or is he a theist now? You want to interpret him as the opposite of what you just interpreted him as? Tell you what, why don't you just interpret him as whatever you feel like at any given moment? Maybe next time he becomes a Hulk Hogan sidekick? Or you could just interpret him as me agreeing with you? Wouldn't that make it easy? All I ask is that you give him a big mustache. Contradiction
Also, no one has ever proven even the existence of God, let alone "many things" about him. All meta-physicists do is postulate. False claim
Moreover, even if he did prove something about something, even God, that would not show that he did not ascribe meager power to the human mind. Non sequitur
>Aristotle has no affiliation with any traditional religion in the sense that he was not Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc., and wouldn't have recognized these religions (not the least because the first two didn't exist during his time).
Aristotle is 100% affiliated with Christianity because St. Aquinas affiliated him with it. The fact that he was dead before St. Aquinas was born is irrelevant to the fact that he is now affiliated with St. Aquinas' religion, as his arguments can be found all over Christian theology. False claim
Moreover, you did not seem to mind dragging him into fine tuning, although he was dead before fine tuning came about. So you want to have it both ways? When it's convenient for you, it's Ok to affiliate him with a concept (fine tuning) although he was dead before the concept came about, but when it gets inconvenient for you, it's suddenly not Ok to affiliate him with a concept (Christianity) because he was dead before it came about? Bad faith
>The problem of evil is something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all-good.
The problem of evil is not something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all good, because you would need to establish the designer first, and the problem of evil does not do that. False claim
>It gets you to knowledge of the absence of a particular property of the designer.
It does not get you to knowledge of the absence of a property of the designer because it does not even establish the designer. All it does is show that a particular kind of a designer is logically inconsistent. So you would need to first establish this designer, before you can start getting to knowing some of its properties. But how are you going to establish this designer? Fine tuning? But you are in the middle of arguing that fine tuning is not nonsense. So you want to use a time machine to jump forward in time where you have established fine tuning as a valid argument, and then jump back here to use it to support the thing that supports it? Circular reasoning
>I don't know why this wouldn't be a form of understanding.
This would not be a form of understanding because it is not possible to understand something full of internal contradictions, paradoxes and circular reasoning that the problem of evil brings with it into fine tuning.
>I don't know where I've said that understanding the designer is something we can do scientifically
I inferred it from you bringing up the simulation hypothesis.
>I don't take the simulation hypothesis very seriously either
Why in the world would you bring something you don't even take seriously yourself into the dialogue? Have you already run out of things you do take seriously? Bad faith
>I don't think that religious understanding and scientific understanding exhaust the kinds of understanding we can have. The kind of understanding that's relevant here that is neither of these two things is metaphysical understanding. So not requiring a commitment to religion is not the same thing as being scientific here.
Totally irrelevant to the question of understanding the designer, but let's be honest here: religion and metaphysics are basically two peas in a pod.
>I don't understand what the designer being all-knowing in contrast to the human intellect being constrained has to do with the designer being beyond understanding.
Again something you just don't understand. You're doing a lot of not understanding for somebody who understands God. In this case, one is beyond understanding of the other because one is infinitely larger than the other.
>Maybe I'll guess at what the confusion might be here - I read "not being beyond understanding" not to mean "having a full understanding". For example, the natural world is not beyond understanding (science has allowed us to gain knowledge of various things about the natural world), but it is not something we have a full understanding of---and it perhaps may not be something we ever have a full understanding of. But I, and I suspect almost everyone, would not say the natural world is beyond understanding even if it is something we will never have a full understanding of. One might argue the finitude of human intellect means we cannot come to a full understanding of God, but this says nothing about whether we can understanding some things about God.
I don't think there is confusion here. I suspect you are feigning ignorance. I could not have been more clear on what I meant by "understanding." "Full understanding," or "complete understanding" is a very problematic concept, that may be either paradoxical or impossible depending on the framework used, and I would not have used it. I defined understanding using your own words ("why and what the designer is") and I added "and how it came to be this way, that it can fine tune universes". How could you be confused with your own words?
>Yes, I don't mean ascribing it contradictory attributes either, and I don't think I've said anything like this. I mean ascribing it attributes like being all-good or not being all-good.
Here, in the second sentence you are doing the thing that you said you never did in the first sentence. There is no such thing as an all-good designer, as you demonstrated yourself with the problem of evil. And you cannot ascribe the not-all-good attribute to a thing you have not even established yet. You cannot use Argument A (problem of evil) to support Argument B (fine tuning) while at the same time using Argument B to support Argument A. Circular reasoning
>I think I've already said much more than needed to explain why the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyond understanding, but I'll summarize it again: There are arguments that, if you buy them, lead you to knowledge of particular properties of the designer.
You have done no such thing. All you've done so far was engage in contradictions, self-refutations, circular reasoning, false claims and other fallacies, so characteristic of goddidit. Not to mention the fact that the definition of understanding you're using in your summary here is yet another reinterpretation, which is not only inconsistent with the definition I gave, but it is also inconsistent with your own wrong interpretation of my definition, where it means "full understanding." Here you are reinterpreting understanding to mean "ascribing paradoxical properties that depend on circular reasoning."
Want to have another go? Just so we don't miss the forest for the trees here, here is the assertion you need to either refute or concede:
"Fine tuning posits a designer that is beyond human capacity to understand."
>Really? You didn't understand me? That's weird, seeing as you claim to be able to understand none other than God. Contradiction
I didn't claim to be able to understand God. What I claimed is that the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyond understanding.
>Those two have done no such thing. Their concepts of God are incompatible with the designer. One is non-intelligent, and the other is indifferent. False claim
Both thinkers ascribe an intellect to God.
However - yes, Spinoza's God is indifferent, and you might reasonably argue that Spinoza's system isn't reconcilable with the fine-tuning argument (Spinoza himself would say that the universe is the way it is out of necessity.)
But the point here is that Spinoza---several of whose arguments are not that alien to the traditional theology before him---is a thinker one could look to to see arguments about the cause of the universe has certain properties. Look at Ethics until Proposition XVII. One can argue for the designer, argue that he is to be identified with substance, and accept all these propositions---coming away with understanding of the designer.
Really, I only mention Spinoza and Aristotle here because I thought one would be less inclined to dismiss them out of hand as saying anything remotely similar to "A triangle does not have three sides. To find out why, and to get saved, come to the service on Sunday! (don't forget the donation)". Of course, Spinoza and Aristotle are not the only ones who discuss God in a way not like this. You can see, for example, Aquinas's discussion of whether God has X property in his Summa, and he makes no assertions like this---but since my earlier mention of theologians elicited the reaction that it did, I tried not to discuss traditional theology further. And no, this is not me saying that further discussion of designer requires religion---one can buy certain arguments about God and his properties but still reject religion; reading the Summa does not force you to buy every single claim that Aquinas makes (even many Christians don't). One can agree with some claims and disagree with others---it's certainly possible to buy the fine-tuning argument and then buy certain Aquinas-style arguments that the designer has certain properties, but disagree with Aquinas's arguments that the designer is to be identified with the God of any religion. Indeed, a common criticism of arguments for God is that even if they succeed and are even successful in establishing certain properties of God, they are not sufficient in establishing the truth of religion.
>Spinoza and atheism
Indeed, it is true that Nadler's thought here is a bit hard to make sense of given Spinoza's discussion of God since belief in God seems to directly contradict atheism, as you've correctly pointed out. What I think Nadler has in mind here is that Spinoza's God is so radically different from the normal theistic conception of God that he is essentially atheist, see a short article by him on his explanation of why Spinoza is atheist [0]. I'm not sure he is using atheist in the normal sense of the word here, yes. I bring this claim of Nadler's up only to make Spinoza's thought (a good portion of which is not too different from, say, Aquinas's thought) and arguments about God and various properties of him more amenable and less liable to dismiss him out of hand for trying to donate to some church, or something like this.
>Also, Spinoza's idea of the intellect that you reference is incompatible with the intelligence required for the fine tuner. Non sequitur
It's not clear that this is the case. The intellect that Spinoza ascribes to God is not unlike the intellect that, just for example, Aquinas, fairly orthodox (little-o) in his theology (and whose fifth way is in a sense a predecessor of design arguments like the fine-tuning argument), ascribes to God. It seems reasonable to say Spinoza's further arguments (e.g. that there is nothing contingent in the world) are ones one cannot square with the fine-tuning argument, but one is not forced to buy those arguments.
>Also, no one has ever proven even the existence of God, let alone "many things" about him. All meta-physicists do is postulate. False claim
Philosophers who engage in metaphysics are primarily in the business of not just postulating arbitrary metaphysical claims, but rather in making arguments for metaphysical claims.
>Moreover, even if he did prove something about something, even God, that would not show that he did not ascribe meager power to the human mind. Non sequitur
The original claim here was that Spinoza ascribed meager power to the human mind, and thus claimed God was beyond understanding. In this sense of "meager power", clearly, Spinoza did not think so, as he believed he had proved various things about God, hence, understood various things about God.
>Aristotle is 100% affiliated with Christianity because St. Aquinas affiliated him with it. The fact that he was dead before St. Aquinas was born is irrelevant to the fact that he is now affiliated with St. Aquinas' religion, as his arguments can be found all over Christian theology. False claim
I don't know what to say here except to repeat again - Aristotle has no affiliation with any traditional religion in the sense that he was not Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc., and wouldn't have recognized these religions (not the least because the first two didn't exist during his time). Aristotle does have an affiliation with Christianity in the sense that his thought was influential on important Christian theologians, such as Aquinas, yes, but this is not the only sense in which a person has a religious affiliation. I mean religious affiliation in the sense that one would normally interpret the question "What is your religious affiliation?" to which the answer has nothing to do with whether your thought has influenced some religion in some major way. Clearly, Aristotle was not affiliated with Christianity in this sense, even if he were alive today, not the least because many aspects of his thought needed to be reinterpreted to be squared with Christian theology. This is relevant because there is no contradiction in someone being an Aristotelian today but not subscribing to any religion, just to illustrate the point of how there is thought compatible with understanding the designer that does not tie one into any religion.
>Moreover, you did not seem to mind dragging him into fine tuning, although he was dead before fine tuning came about. So you want to have it both ways? When it's convenient for you, it's Ok to affiliate him with a concept (fine tuning) although he was dead before the concept came about, but when it gets inconvenient for you, it's suddenly not Ok to affiliate him with a concept (Christianity) because he was dead before it came about? Bad faith
I haven't dragged him into fine-tuning or affiliated him with fine-tuning. What I have done is pointed to him as an example of someone whose arguments about the designer of the world (unmoved mover) could be leveraged to establish properties of the designer, hence gain understanding of the designer. The only reason I have pointed to him as opposed to, say, Aquinas, is to avoid a dismissive response involving donations to a church.
>The problem of evil is not something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all good, because you would need to establish the designer first, and the problem of evil does not do that. False claim
But what's at stake here is not whether any argument succeeds in establishing the designer. What's at stake here is whether the fine-tuning argument posits a designer that is beyond understanding. What I'm saying here is that if one buys the fine-tuning argument, one could plausibly establish that the designer could not be all-good via the problem of evil, thus gaining knowledge of the designer, viz. that the designer is not all-good.
>It does not get you to knowledge of the absence of a property of the designer because it does not even establish the designer. All it does is show that a particular kind of a designer is logically inconsistent. So you would need to first establish this designer, before you can start getting to knowing some of its properties. But how are you going to establish this designer? Fine tuning? But you are in the middle of arguing that fine tuning is not nonsense. So you want to use a time machine to jump forward in time where you have established fine tuning as a valid argument, and then jump back here to use it to support the thing that supports it? Circular reasoning
But I'm not in the business of establishing a designer, what I am in the business of is establishing that the fine-tuning argument is not positing a designer beyond understanding. Indeed, I am saying that the fine-tuning argument is not nonsense. Of course, an argument doesn't have to succeed to not be nonsense.
(Aside: this is why there is a stark difference in tone between the SEP article for the fine-tuning argument [1] and intelligent design [2], relevant here due to your earlier comments about both being equally silly examples of "Goddidit". )
>This would not be a form of understanding because it is not possible to understand something full of internal contradictions, paradoxes and circular reasoning that the problem of evil brings with it into fine tuning.
Continue off the fine-tuning argument as presented in three statements earlier.(1) and (2) are premises and (3) is the conclusion (and it is a valid argument - accepting the premises logically leads to the conclusion---perhaps it is not a sound argument, but that is neither here nor there). Suppose you accept this argument (because you accept (1) and (2)), and then accept that there was a designer of the universe. Now consider this argument:
Premise (1): There is evil in the universe.
Premise (2): If the designer was all-good, there would be no evil in the universe.
Conclusion (3): The designer is not all-good.
If you accept (1) and (2) of the fine-tuning argument (and also go on to accept that the universe was designed by a designer), and accept (1) and (2) of this argument, you are logically led to knowledge of the designer, hence understanding of the designer. So it seems that the acceptance of the fine-tuning does not logically lead us into a designer which we can no longer gain forms of understanding of.
>Why in the world would you bring something you don't even take seriously yourself into the dialogue? Have you already run out of things you do take seriously? Bad faith
What I do or don't take seriously isn't relevant to whether the fine-tuning argument posits a designer that is beyond understanding or whether religion is the only place you can take the fine-tuning argument to. I don't buy the fine-tuning argument either (because I am skeptical of premise (2)), but I think credit should be given where credit is due. "Bad faith" doesn't demonstrate that an argument is invalid anyway.
>Totally irrelevant to the question of understanding the designer, but let's be honest here: religion and metaphysics are basically two peas in a pod.
I don't know why a kind of understanding we can have of the designer would be irrelevant to the question of understanding the designer, namely because showing that that kind of understanding of the designer is possible, then that answers the question of understanding the designer.
>religion and metaphysics are basically two peas in a pod
Well, this is a contentious claim among theist and atheist philosophers alike, so it warrants being substantiated.
>Again something you just don't understand. You're doing a lot of not understanding for somebody who understands God. In this case, one is beyond understanding of the other because one is infinitely larger than the other.
I don't see how God's intellect being infinitely larger than human intellect implies that God is beyond understanding.
>How could you be confused with your own words?
I don't think I am, if this isn't the confusion, then I'm sorry.
You can see the thinkers mentioned thus far for arguments of what God is, why God is, or how God came to be this way that it can fine-tune universes.
>Here, in the second sentence you are doing the thing that you said you never did in the first sentence. There is no such thing as an all-good designer, as you demonstrated yourself with the problem of evil. And you cannot ascribe the not-all-good attribute to a thing you have not even established yet. You cannot use Argument A (problem of evil) to support Argument B (fine tuning) while at the same time using Argument B to support Argument A. Circular reasoning
But I'm not using one argument to support another. What I am doing is giving just one example of how one might go about this project of understanding the designer posited by the fine-tuning argument---namely, using the problem of evil to establish that the designer cannot be all-good, thus gaining understanding of the designer.
>All you've done so far was engage in contradictions, self-refutations, circular reasoning, false claims and other fallacies, so characteristic of goddidit.
But it's not clear that I've done this in what I've said to explain why the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyong understanding.
>Here you are reinterpreting understanding to mean "ascribing paradoxical properties that depend on circular reasoning."
But this isn't what I've said.
>Want to have another go?
Not particularly.
Now that I've hit the HN limit for a comment's limit (...among other reasons), I now suspect that HN is no longer the appropriate place for this discussion anyway (unless someone tells me that it would be fruitful for me to continue replying here). If you'd like to continue, feel free to drop an email (or XMPP or Matrix account---but please, not Discord or anything like that).
You're arguing that it's impossible to consider the concept of a higher power without disregarding science. You're wrong. Period.
Alternatively you're arguing that examples of specific faiths you provide are equivalent to the broader concept of accepting the chance of a higher power. Which is also wrong.
Saying "because God did it" as an answer to any question has the same value as saying "because pixel cooked the music". If you want to consider those two groups of words "explanations" go for it. They are grammatically correct, and if they satisfy the curious mind they are good enough.
It's not uncommon now for people to use comment sections to deliver lectures, they already know what they want to say, they break it into multiple parts and they just paste it in assuming that other people will happily provide the right kind of conjugations. Good to point it out.
You've been explained time and again how the anthropic principle explicitly doesn't need "God" or any sort of intelligent design and is simply the conclusion that can be drawn from a statistic calculation yet you continue bringing that up.
Repeating the same argument despite it having been refuted isn't conductive to further discussion, at a certain point you'll only get replies out of pity at best, like this one.
> Saying "because God did it" as an answer to any question has the same value as saying "because pixel cooked the music".
The same ascertainable to humans value perhaps, but if one assumes they are necessarily completely equal (there is no God, in fact) you would typically want evidence. But this is only typically, some things in science don't need proof.
There are different kinds of explanations according to different measures, but all explanation is about identifying the causes of things. "You did it" identifies the agent, the efficient cause. I can, of course, explain how the agent (you) effected the cause, but youdidit is still an explanation, even if it isn't the kind you are interested in hearing.
Youdidit is an explanation, because it doesn't terminate the inquisition. You can then ask what caused you, then what caused the thing that caused you, and so on until you get to the point of saying "and that's as far as we know, we are working on figuring out the rest".
With goddidit, you abruptly got to the end through an escape hatch, and you are done having done no work. There is nothing that explains god, by definition, and there is no "figuring out the rest".
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