That is what I was referring to as "crypto-erasure" (also known as "crypto-shredding"). I'm not sure what counts as legally validated, but some have shared concerns that the encryption you use to do this would need to be future-proof against, say, advancements in quantum computing cracking the encryption down the road even after the key has been thrown out.
if the references don't point to actual data, you don't need this.
- minimum 2 parts. a relay (reference hash) and the cold/true storage portion. you can break the reference hash up and reassemble only for secret holders. which brings us to:
- content-based routing
- there are also deterministic vaults for rolling keys
i'm actually not sure in what high-level situation "crypto-erasure" would work in because being able to re-key a reference means you have complete control. so why would you need to erase the "bad" key when you can just switch the reference?
^ both generally use the same concept i described above and solve GDPR "delete" issue. actually, it solves GDPR completely if you can just rely on the DID. "hard delete" is a separate issue, though-- no other way to get around that but to fork/version + replay your store and re-reference anyone who wants to hard delete if you didn't use reference hashes.
