And when a practical application of SHA-1 collision generation to PGP is found, it won't be their fault either. After all, the OpenPGP standard says they have to support SHA-1! Blame the IETF!
Stuff like this happened to TLS for a decade, and then the TLS working group wised up and redesigned the whole protocol to foreclose on these kinds of attacks. That's never going to happen with PGP, despite it having a tiny fraction of the users TLS has.
Support is different than utilization. GPG no longer uses SHA1 for message digests and has not done so for a fair time now. This what the preferences in a public key generated with gpg2 recently look like:
So SHA1 is the last choice. Note that 3DES is there at the end of the symmetrical algorithm list. It ain't broken either so they still include it for backward compatibility. This is a good thing. It is essential in a privacy system for a store and forward communications medium.
Stuff like this happened to TLS for a decade, and then the TLS working group wised up and redesigned the whole protocol to foreclose on these kinds of attacks. That's never going to happen with PGP, despite it having a tiny fraction of the users TLS has.