More losses than what? Again, offense was slightly favored over defense, which is the only relevant comparison if you're trying to evaluate the claim "charging into machine guns doesn't work".
The only relevant comparison is manpower losses of the two sides, and every assault cost a lot more men to the attacker than the defender. The attacker has to have a massive concentration of manpower and numerical superiority.
If this were not true, no one would setup defences.
> The only relevant comparison is manpower losses of the two sides, and every assault cost a lot more men to the attacker than the defender.
OK, we've established that you're eager to declaim on a subject you never actually bothered learning anything about:
>> Consider: at the Somme (1916), the British and French attacked and the Germans defended; the allies took 620,000 losses, inflicted 445,000 (a ratio of about 4:3 favoring the defender) and got basically nowhere.
>> At Verdun (also 1916), the Germans attacked and the French defended; the Germans took 355,000 losses to the French’s 400,000 (a ratio of 7:8 favoring the attacker) and got basically nowhere.
>> Over the whole of the German Spring Offensives (1918), the Germans took 688,341 casualties and inflicted 863,374 (a ratio of about 3:4, again favoring the attacker), knocked huge salients in the allied lines, didn’t break through and thereby lost the war.
>> I think here it is worth really noting how high the defender’s casualties are in these battles; I keep noting this but I want to stress: defenders suffered high casualties in trench warfare. Being on the defensive operationally did not save you any more than being tactically on the defensive did. You were just as likely to be killed in your trench by an enemy shell or grenade as you were on the offense machine-gunned trying to cross no man’s land. If the latter holds a larger place in the Anglophone consciousness (e.g. 1917 and Gallipoli) that has more to do with the British and Commonwealth forces being more often on the attack than the defense, not on the casualty implications of attacking or defending.
It's also a myth that losing more people is what matters. Wars are won and lost on morale. Losses have their effect through their impact on morale long before they start to restrict your fundamental capabilities.
Compare the quote attributed to Ho Chi Minh:
You will kill ten of us, we will kill one of you, but in the end, you will tire of it first.
He won and we lost. It's not because we took more casualties.
