On the topic of "novel, non-pin-tumbler mechanisms": I can recommend the videos by Stuff Made Here [1][2], where he designs two novel anti-picking lock mechanisms, and the related video [3] where LockPickingLawyer tries to pick and bypass them. Together they give a whole new understanding of lock design and picking methods.
Glad you enjoy my locks :) Making locks is very interesting, but it reminds me of why they say you shouldn't write your own encryption. Even if the theory is sound, it just takes one little mistake for someone to bypass all your grand designs...
Shane, heartfelt thanks for what you are doing. Having spent a large portion of my career in early childhood STEM education, 'edutainment' is the best means I have come across to communicate complex topics while capturing attention of youth. You are in my personal 'Top 5' and your content is now my go to recommendation to friends/parents.
P.S. I used to work as a retail educator at MakerBot, while you were with FormLabs. SLA always blew my FDM centric mind
The pins would have to be fairly far apart to not be affected by each others' magnets I think. Also, this would be pretty easy to 'brute force' with a special key with some electromagnet coils. With physical tumblers this is much harder to do, work all the small moving parts (though I believe such tools are now also possible)
After all, even a physical lock is just a combination lock. The combination is just 'encoded' in a metal strip. Or in the above case, with magnets. And it's still possible to copy the key by reading it.
Better to use a digital key with asymmetric encryption. Using that you can prove you have a private key without actually giving up the information needed to fabricate a copy.
AD: and here I was about to appeal to HN to get this article over to you! Hope it inspires another version, you had some wonderful novel concepts in your lock(s).
Abloy Protec2 is definitely a winner. Their padlocks are great as well, because they use hardened bodies even for their small travel locks. I used these on my Pelican case when I went around the world and had multiple attempts while checking in my camera gear to break in by "security personnel" in sketchy places, and nobody succeeded at doing anything other than marking the shackle. Someone also tried to pick it and failed.
The reality is, of course no security is perfect. In the case I used it the easiest path in was cutting the hinges on the case, but that would have been obviously and permanently destructive. Removing the lock and replacing it would theoretically get me onward traveling prior to noticing, where-as a destroyed case would have gotten me to immediately implicate the likely perpetrators.
I had an Abloy Protec2 euro lock on my front door and was happy with the mechanism at first, but it did not last. The lock failed in the locked position after 3 years triggering significant cost to remove the cylinder body from the mortise lock. The drill-out took 5 seconds at most…
This is the #1 thing they teach you in lockpicking class anyway. If you want to burgle, buy a crowbar or in this case a drill. It even doubles as a weapon, they will say jokingly. Though I imagine burglars will actually think that way.
Lockpicking is more interesting as a sport, or for legitimate purposes. For illegitimate ones it just takes too long, and its positives like being silent aren't of any benefit to robbers. And spies have better tools.
Modern door locks are full of mitigations like mushroom pins anyway. Data centre racks, office drawers, filing cabinets, those are the ones you can open in seconds because they tend to have cheap locks with really poor manufacturing tolerances. This is what makes lockpicking so interesting to pentesters.
Source: lockpicking class at security conferences (most of the defcon-style ones do them). It was really enlightening to see how hard it is to pick a good lock. And how easy to pick a crap one.
But 5 seconds is particularly bad indeed. Usually the cylinders are made of metals with different hardnesses inside to deflect a drill sideways. Brute force will still get them but 5 seconds is quick.
I have Abloy Protec2 on my front door, with optional hardened plate (product code CH101) protecting it from drilling. The key hole in the plate is just big enough for a key to go through, but not big enough to allow damage to the lock mechanism. They've thought about it.
> Are those marks visible with the naked eye or do you have to use magnification to see them?
Visible with the naked eye
> Are there any pics anywhere that show what such marks look like, and could they be caused by anything other than picking?
Sure, it's possible they could have been caused by something else, but it's unlikely given the context.
Yes, there are photos, but I'm not able to share them at the moment. When I travel internationally to "sketchy" places, I always photograph my luggage thoroughly before and after transiting.
Hah I photograph my stuff too in hotels when I leave for the day. And I leave my stuff arranged randomly so I can see if it's been disturbed. When I come back I check it with the photo.
I thought I was just being paranoid.
Actually I probably am paranoid. Doesn't mean that aren't after me though! :)
Fascinating information, but considering all of the posts on HN about how many other types of forensics are pseudoscience, I wonder how lockpicking forensics measures up.
This is probably the easiest kind of forensics to do scientifically, because you can just buy locks and put them through X cycles (even automatically) and then look at the pins. Then pick them in various ways and look at the marks. I'm relatively sure that's how most of the data on that site was created.
I don't use TSA compliant locks on my luggage when I check it. There is NO legal requirement to use a TSA compliant lock. The legal requirement is that the TSA must be able to inspect the luggage. You can get around this by requesting pre-inspection as part of checking your luggage (which is required for firearms and some other types of checked luggage in the US, anyway). Pre-inspection is typically done in the presence of the passenger, who can then relock the luggage before checking it.
In other countries, pre-inspection is typically required as well, but they don't have any concept of "TSA compliant" in the first place, that's a US thing.
TSA compliant locks are a ridiculous concept and nobody should ever use them for anything. Certainly not for anything important you travel with.
This is correct, if you want to be absolutely sure that the TSA won't mess with you, just fly with firearms. On the flip side, this comes with its own challenges for international travel and in certain states (NY, in particular, has stupid laws and even more stupid enforcement of those laws).
If I understand correctly, NY law doesn't matter so long as you are on the secure side of the terminal and just passing through. I think I do remember someone getting hosed because the airline basically did an unexpected layover/cancelation to someone in NY and essentially forced them to take possession of something NY deemed illegal.
I used to be into locksport, and particularly high-end locks. A word of warning: A friend of mine once put a high-end $400 padlock on his storage unit when he stored his college stuff over the summer. It is the only storage unit in that facility that was ever broken into. A thief saw the lock, thought they must be hiding something good, and came back with a crowbar to lever the door open. Nothing was stolen but I think they were expecting a huge drug stash.
This is good advice. This is why I like my bicycles to look trashy while actually consisting of functional, well maintained and often expensive gear. A little bit of rust color here and there. A little bit of tape at some spots etc.
Your goal is not to look like a shitty target, it is just to look like a shittier target then the others.
I totally appreciate geeking out on something like this, and take no issue with people who are really into these locks.
However.
I find this argument to be a bit silly:
> If you get in without my notice, you may be lying in wait for me inside.
The risk to the average person for this type of threat is so low, that you are more likely to die because you fall in your shower and rescuers can't get through your door than an assassin lying in wait inside your house to get you when you walk in.
Emergency services should probably assume permissions to kick in your front door if necessary to save your life, I'd certainly give that permission if required explicitly.
That said, the real point is that emergency services don't need to be surreptitious, they're also welcome to put a brick, axe or anything they have to hand through my living room window if that serves the same purpose (assuming my front door was too tough to kick in, etc).
Yeah, emergency services picking a lock is probably not a realistic scenario, but probably not that much more unrealistic than an assassin picking your lock and waiting in your house to kill you.
Sometimes emergency services will try simple lock raking or lock/door bypasses in an effort to not destroy the lock/door unnecessarily, as it can put a financial burden on the occupant. I think in some circles they refer to this as "respectful entry", e.g. https://coastalfiretraining.com/
The "lying in wait" argument, to me, feels like it assumes that the door I enter through is really the only point of access. It may be obvious if someone broke in through the front door or the window next to it, but it might be weeks before I notice if someone forced the garage door and gained access there. There are several points of access that I wouldn't notice before it was too late for a lying in wait type attack. Most of those would require breaking glass though.
Those are just a couple examples that first popped into my head. Seems like maybe a few people could be in a middle ground in threat level and resources between "get a better lock" and "hire a security staff."
> High-Security Mechanical Locks comprehensively surveys and explains the highly technical area of high security locks in a way that is accessible to a wide audience. Well over 100 different locks are presented, organized into 6 basic types. Each chapter introduces the necessary concepts in a historical perspective and further categorizes the locks. This is followed by detailed 'how it works' descriptions with many pictures, diagrams and references. The descriptions are based on actual dissections of the real locks.
One thing I didn't see him explicitly mention, but if you can get your hands on blanks you can replicate any key bitting (even Medeco biaxial and angled) with a file and enough dedication (with the exception of moving/magnetic/electronic elements, which he does bring up).
So then it's a game of getting blanks or a subset-blank that will fit in the keyway. I don't see anyone in here that has linked to the relevant Defcon video on Medeco duplication here:
https://youtu.be/ij0c-236O0k
Even without a blank you can sometimes do it. I used a printed photocopy of a office key and then modified my existing (already cut) key of the same type by adding layers of metallic epoxy and filing them back down to the correct hills and valleys. Was a pain but it got me a “master” key to all the doors in a building I worked at. Be careful if letting someone borrow the master key even for just a few minutes.
Nice. My "library" consists only of Abloy Protec2 and BiLock NG locks. It's interesting to see some of the others out there.
One lock this article doesn't refer to is EVVA MCS, which uses a magnetic element as well. I hope to add it to the collection one day, but haven't yet found a justification.
On the other hand, my front door is still a standard pin tumbler, I figure nobody is going to pick my front door open when they could just as easily break the adjacent window.
One thing though; if they pick the door, there will be no obvious trace of a break-in and the insurance may not pay out. It's kinda better to force them to break the window. And they might be reluctant to do so because it causes a lot of noise and hopefully draws the attention, making it less attractive to do so.
I guess so, but I'm not sure picking or bumping residential locks is heard of where I live. Last time I was burgled they used a crowbar to force entry by breaking the lock. Even that's rare. The overwhelming majority of burglaries here are opportunistic based on unlocked doors/windows.
There's a LockPickingLawyer video on YouTube [1] where he shows you a simple modification that seizes the lock upon picking attempts. I would do this, but unlike him I only have one entrance door, so in the event it is seized I'd have to break in.
The lock is only there to keep people honest. Opening the door/breaking a window etc. will trigger the home alarm system as well as being caught on camera. Killing my internet and jamming the cellular backup is not really a huge concern in my area as there are plenty of more ripe targets (attached garage doors left open all day etc.)
I recently ordered new deadbolts for my house and I chose ones (kwikset 980) that were defeated quickly by LockPickingLawyer. His video actually caused Consumer Reports to pull a recommendation of that lock.
My reasoning was:
- Lockpickinglawyer basically gets into everything (I guess except the Abloy being discussed in these comments)
- These locks were affordable for ANSI grade 1
- These locks are user re-keyable (I was looking at schlage B60N - affordable and nice, but basically would have had to pay a locksmith to get keyed alike)
- Lockpickinglawyer's video showed me a much more complex mechanism, and picking process, than a standard pin tumbler lock
I think a lot of people take his videos and have the binary thought process "lock was defeated therefore the lock is crap", but if you watch enough of them there is a lot of nuance. He defeats high security locks that are nevertheless robust and tricky enough to trust on your front door.
Agreed - if people really want in, they'll use technology ranging from rock through a window to cordless angle grinders before they'll invest time in learning how to pick locks.
So true. Most physical security is just an illusion. After watching gun safe opening videos, I have been thinking about emptying the gun safe and building a false wall to hide my guns.
IIRC, he has since picked the referenced lock (Abloy Protec), but hasn't yet picked the Abloy Protec2. I imagine most of the locks referenced in the original post are in the same category.
From the few I've watched, most of the time he just seems to end-run around the supposed security of whatever it is. The double-crescent-wrench trick is a classic, "here take this super expensive fancy electronic lock, watch what happens when we just snap it in half with two tools I can fit in my pocket."
How is that in any way a detriment to his content? He's highlighting the utter failure of the product to provide the security it purports to. See: where he opens the small safe with a plain kitchen butter knife
Maybe if he was blatantly 'cheating', by using a battery powered sawzall or an oxy-arc torch to just blast off the lock. But he uses more mundane items, like the knife, or two crescent wrenches.
I meant that those are my favourite episodes, not that I see them as poor form. If you can trivially bypass an expensive "high security" lock without even bothering to pick it, that's something potential buyers should know! Too many companies focus on the fancy bling parts and ignore the fundamentals of security.
It's like that 'secrets of physical pen-testers' talk where half the time they can bypass security with a combination of simple low-tech tools (eg. under-door tools) and creative thinking (eg. blowing cigarette smoke through a door to trigger the sensor). The most efficient way to get through security is to not have to break it at all.
This goes for software as well as physical security.
I think the Ramset videos might count as 'cheating' - there probably aren't many locks designed to take the force of a .22 blank powder charge to the body and survive. And the ones about shooting locks with a 50 cal rifle definitely count ;) Still really interesting to see the limits of lock endurance nevertheless - really underscores the idea that no lock is undefeatable, it's just about how far somebody is willing to go to defeat it.
He tends to do several videos in a row on a theme - for instance, slicing through 'cut-proof' bags, or snapping shackles with spanners, etc. But you just need to go back maybe ten videos and you'll find that the majority of his content by far is about lock picking.
As I recall the double crescent wrench thing was mostly for demo purposes, and to show how he thought he had a more effective technique than another youtube channel.
While he sometimes he does destructive attacks just to highlight weak security (zinc, plastic) or poorly fitted parts, the vast majority of his videos are picks, often using specialised tools, like the disc detainer he helped design.
It's cool to see high-end locks address the key duplication problem. With 3D printers and phone cameras it's become quite easy to duplicate keys. I've tried this just for fun with my own key -- it's a little tedious, but definitely doable by a determined amateur.
One thing that usually overlooked in many high security lock discussions is the key stock thickness. If you look at a typical house key side by side with the high security version it's notably thicker and more durable.
Prevents breaking a key off in a lock by a large factor.
Lock Picking Lawyer picks and disassembles various locks, including an ASSA with two sidebars[1]. Note that it's far easier to pick a lock that you are prepared to pick clamped into a vise on your workbench than one in the field.
You don't necessarily have to replace the whole door frame, you can buy an aftermarket frame reinforcer like Door Armor to distribute the force of a kicking attack (which is a lot more common than lock picking) across the frame. You can also make sure to get thick strike places and long (3") screws to make sure the door latch and deadbolt are sliding into things that are actually screwed to the house framing rather than held in by tiny screws that will just rip out with a good kick.
I've sort of daydream about better locks some times. The vast majority of the locks in the US are trivially easy to pick. It probably not worth the money though since most criminals don't pick locks, and the ones that do have better targets.
Just a thought. Even if you think someone may not pick your lock, it may be easy to drill it open by destroying the pins. I’ve done that once in a lock inside my home we didn’t have a key to.
Higher security locks may be made out of stronger metals, preventing this.
Yes, the article talks about anti drill pins designed to break bits. The locks may still be made out of brass, which might actually improve their function as the bit is spinning faster when it hits the hardened pin.
> many doors are easily defeated themselves by a sawzall.
Wooden doors, presumably? It was interesting to see metal entrance doors when I was visiting apartments in China. USA doors all seem to be simple wood.
Older doors are wood. Most of the newer doors are at least metal covered wood.
They do make metal blades for Sawzall. Without and exposed edge I don't think a Sawzall would be that effective. It would probably work, but would take while to get started until you get the tip through.
It depend on how well the jam is protected - most doors in the US are simple wood - shove a metal blade on a sawzall through the crack and cut the deadbolt in half - or the hinges.
Even the metal doors are usually pretty light metal. A true security door is very expensive - and heavy.
Yeah, I just mean the metal shell is at least slightly better than straight wood. Usually the exterior doors don't have that gap to shove a blade in (gap is exposed on the inside), but it depends if the trim can be ripped off to expose the gap from the outside. Basically, I guess all I'm saying is Sawzall would not be my first choice since there are generally much faster methods depending on the specifics.
I'd imagine it is a huge difference. Especially considering the author has dogs that will continue to make noise after they hear a loud noise.
And of course in the event that the owner wasn't home, a break in would leave noticeable damage where picking would not (unless they failed and the anti pick pins got stuck).
Different kind of lock, but I discovered the other day that the tumbler combination lock box I use for my car keys while surfing can be trivially picked - and there are youtube videos. Apparently this has been a big problem in SF in the last few years. Perhaps a dial combination lock box (e.g. Kidde) will be more secure.
Of the "lock box" type key holders, it seems like the Kidde mini-safe box is pretty decent (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLg86_C7rrs) - though it's not a doorknob hanger so to install it properly you'd want to screw it into something sturdy.
See LockPickingLawyer on Youtube, but basically every lock you can buy in a store is full of zero days. The only thing keeping them "safe" is most criminals are to lazy to learn the known zero days by watching a Youtube video or three and practising a little.
Any recommendations on "decent" combination locks? I've been using Sesamee, mostly because of my grandfather's recommendation "I had this on my footlocker and you ain't gonna saw through it". But it is open to a feeler attack by the dials.
Whether this is outrageous compared to a $28 'builder-grade' deadbolt at a box store depends on the value of the things inside and the probability of an attempt at a theft.
Agree. I wanted to get something better, just because why not? I ended up just going with some commercial schalge that's just slightly more durable than the standard ones, came with reinforced strike plates, etc. There's not a lot of crime in my area and there's not much that someone would want to steal.
One thing to consider if sticking with "normal" locks is that you can still get the reinforced strike plates, pick a key design that makes bump keys or raking less effective (supposedly), not hiding a key, etc. Nothing is perfect. You can have the best doors and windows and someone can still knock a hole in your wall if they really want to.
At least in some locations insurance companies may reward you with much lower premiums if you have sufficiently secure locks, alarm systems etc when the value of your contents is high enough (maybe you inherited some valuable art work or something).
It's typically done in thresholds too - start off with a small reduction in premiums, then a big one, then they won't insure you at all unless you fit this stuff.
Ok, but if the LockPickingLawyer doesn't try breaking it and fail (or take long enough to succeed that the desired effect is achieved), I'm not buying it.
Changing the locks to my house / apartment is the first thing I do for us, my parents and our kids.
Personally I most of the time choose the Abloy Protec2, since I love the technology and the keys too.
I never understood "security people" who would spend a week hardening their OS but did nothing about their locks.
If you want to "get into" the art of opening locks without violence (most of the time :) ) I would suggest attending a meeting of the fine folks of ToooL
>I never understood "security people" who would spend a week hardening their OS but did nothing about their locks.
Very different threat models. Computers are available to anyone on the internet or the authors of any software I choose to install; remote attacks require very few resources and are common.
Physical attacks are different. The odds of anyone choosing to attack my particular house are very low; they can't attack thousands of houses at once, so basic techniques such as "being slightly less attractive than my neighbors" work well. As a standard residential house, picking the lock isn't the way anyone's going to get in. They could break the window next to the door. They could kick a door in. They could climb to the second level and open a window. They're not at all likely to pick my lock, though.
I advocate for using a decent consumer lock (i.e. not Kwikset - Schlage is sufficient IMO) with a properly installed deadbolt and strike plate but no further for most people.
> never understood "security people" who would spend a week hardening their OS but did nothing about their locks.
I don't understand someone spending an absurd amount of money on a very high security deadbolt for a residential application. Burglars don't pick locks to get into houses. They force the door with crowbars, or break a window / open the latch, or climb to a second floor window that people rarely lock, and so on.
Unless your door frame is sufficiently strong enough and the door secure enough as well, spending hundreds of dollars on very high security deadbolts is stupid.
Ever. LPL is wildly over rated by the laymen. Most of what he picks isn't even remotely high security. Been waiting for him to do a pick and gut of an assa twin he received years ago but it's never going to happen. If you want to see someone who is as good as the hype says they are, try artichoke2000
They do. There are locks that are over 100 years old in design that nobody has ever published a picking method or tool for publically (kromer protector comes to mind).
Beyond that most locks that require specialized tooling to pick or are ranked above red belt on the lpu rating chart are more than secure enough for even commercial purposes. The chances of an intruder successfully picking say abloy protec 2, clavis f22, opnus mmxII, assa twin combi, etc are infinitesimally small compared to them trying to brute force entry through another opening like a window
You shouldn't get a wrong impression from LPL videos, he practices picks extensively and said he only starts recording when he's pretty sure he can pick the given lock consistently.
Given enough time, any lock can be broken into, and no manufacturer will claim their lock is foolproof. Even safes are rated only for how long they will deter a determined thief, e.g., a TL-15 safe will resist break-in for 15 minutes.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7vPNcnYWQ4 [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2A2NY29iQdI [3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ecy1FBdCRbQ