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Are you saying that the only check possible is looking at it while its in your hand?



The problem stated was that the marker machine lies 1 out of 15 entries. The paper would contain an incorrect selection occasionally. So, yeah, it would require no one noticing during the act.


Indeed, and the math is the same. If out of 3 million voters, just 1000 double-check the printout, they will detect a 1/100 flip with probability 99.996%.


Of course it's important that enough people check their ballot and say, "hey this isn't what I meant" it triggers a formal audit. Not just letting those 1000 have a redo and chalk it up to human error.


Sure, but 1000 is just 1 in 3000 voters. In practice it's going to be way more than that, probably 2 or 3 in 10. Thats hundreds of thousands of voters, many of whom are going to be punctilious people. Of all the suggested fuckery methods, this would be caught the fastest IMO.


And yet somebody who voted said far above in this thread that the machine reads a barcode on their ballot, so they have 0% chance of verifying if their vote was entered correctly. And there is always the added problem of a dieselgate style obfuscation: The machine counts votes differently when in verification mode than in actual vote counting mode.

My preferred machine would be one that did not use integrated circuits, but was simple enough that the entire board and circuit was visible - with no software beyond the circuitry at all. You just need a very simple sensor and tally wheels that mechanically advance, like those used for measuring wheels etc. No need for memory. Keep automation to the absolute bare minimum.


The ballot printout is not discarded, is it? If not, then the ballot-barcode consistency in the sample can be verified as part of the audit.




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