As for Byzantine fault tolerance, I'm not sure I understand how you'd reach a lot of competing services. Who is paying for all of this? The voters definitely aren't. The state can choose to only pay for nodes friendly to the current government if it wants. So who else?
In 2, I explicitly said that it is only my devices that are infected, not the servers. My devices communicate to the servers exactly as if I had voted for Bob, but they show me that I'm voting for Alice.
In scenario 1, it could be either one. If it's my own devices that are compromised and refusing to let me vote for who I want is to add, then it doesn't matter which of the many vote services I connect to, the result will be the same. It's just a simpler variant of 2, in this case.
Also, this is all not "added on top of" the existing system, because poll workers today only need to know how to count votes. To handle this enormously complex system, they have to know a HELL of a lot more, even to help voters. So, you need entirely new people in all of this, replacing the dead simple system that even an illiterate person can successfully volunteer for, with a system that requires IT people and others.
And if you'll say "but you can always fall back to the paper polling system", that means we're adding a bunch of cost, so it makes the bar even higher to prove so much extra effectiveness for this. Plus all the insecurity now compounds - the security of a system is equal to the security of its weakest component, so adding a strong security component on a weak system has no effect. And if I'm right and the e-voting system is more easily attackable, then we've actively worsened the security of the whole vote by adding it on top of the old system.
For the "tokens" that you're giving: those are either private keys (in which case, whoever gave you the token might be holding on to a copy), or they're not (in which case, they don't play a part in the cryptography). I can generate a private key all I want, but someone needs to take the corresponding public key if I am to participate in the system. With Bitcoin, this is not an issue as we're not trying to enforce one man - one wallet, quite the opposite.
In all the talk about the intimidation issues with the current system, you've ignored the core difference: in the current system, I may be able to dissuade you from voting, but I can't vote in your stead. Even if I try to, I am generating video evidence at every polling station that I do it. And it doesn't scale: the more places I go to, the bigger a chance that I'll end up being caught.
But with home voting, I can collect private keys (and tokens, whatever those are) from 100k people and vote through all of them however I like. I am not going anywhere official, so at worse I have to hide my IP so it's not like too many votes are coming from a single place.
I'll be fair and note that this is also a problem for mail-in voting. It's a big reason why I'm not a supporter of mail-in voting either, and am happy that my country doesn't do it. By the way, the fact that the USA doesn't require ID to vote also seems crazy to me. I understand the reasons for it, but the fixes are so simple (but take a lot of time) that it's amazing to me that they are not even discussing implementing them.
And related to distrust in the current voting system, particularly in regards to the 2020 and the 2000 elections: most of the distrust was actually focused on (a) voting machines [hanging chads in 2000, "Venezuelan" voting machines in 2020], or (b) voter registration issues. Moving to an entirely electronic system as you describe makes (a) MUCH worse, and doesn't improve (b)
in the slightest (as you still need to register just the same).
In 2, I explicitly said that it is only my devices that are infected, not the servers. My devices communicate to the servers exactly as if I had voted for Bob, but they show me that I'm voting for Alice.
In scenario 1, it could be either one. If it's my own devices that are compromised and refusing to let me vote for who I want is to add, then it doesn't matter which of the many vote services I connect to, the result will be the same. It's just a simpler variant of 2, in this case.
Also, this is all not "added on top of" the existing system, because poll workers today only need to know how to count votes. To handle this enormously complex system, they have to know a HELL of a lot more, even to help voters. So, you need entirely new people in all of this, replacing the dead simple system that even an illiterate person can successfully volunteer for, with a system that requires IT people and others.
And if you'll say "but you can always fall back to the paper polling system", that means we're adding a bunch of cost, so it makes the bar even higher to prove so much extra effectiveness for this. Plus all the insecurity now compounds - the security of a system is equal to the security of its weakest component, so adding a strong security component on a weak system has no effect. And if I'm right and the e-voting system is more easily attackable, then we've actively worsened the security of the whole vote by adding it on top of the old system.
For the "tokens" that you're giving: those are either private keys (in which case, whoever gave you the token might be holding on to a copy), or they're not (in which case, they don't play a part in the cryptography). I can generate a private key all I want, but someone needs to take the corresponding public key if I am to participate in the system. With Bitcoin, this is not an issue as we're not trying to enforce one man - one wallet, quite the opposite.
In all the talk about the intimidation issues with the current system, you've ignored the core difference: in the current system, I may be able to dissuade you from voting, but I can't vote in your stead. Even if I try to, I am generating video evidence at every polling station that I do it. And it doesn't scale: the more places I go to, the bigger a chance that I'll end up being caught.
But with home voting, I can collect private keys (and tokens, whatever those are) from 100k people and vote through all of them however I like. I am not going anywhere official, so at worse I have to hide my IP so it's not like too many votes are coming from a single place.
I'll be fair and note that this is also a problem for mail-in voting. It's a big reason why I'm not a supporter of mail-in voting either, and am happy that my country doesn't do it. By the way, the fact that the USA doesn't require ID to vote also seems crazy to me. I understand the reasons for it, but the fixes are so simple (but take a lot of time) that it's amazing to me that they are not even discussing implementing them.
And related to distrust in the current voting system, particularly in regards to the 2020 and the 2000 elections: most of the distrust was actually focused on (a) voting machines [hanging chads in 2000, "Venezuelan" voting machines in 2020], or (b) voter registration issues. Moving to an entirely electronic system as you describe makes (a) MUCH worse, and doesn't improve (b) in the slightest (as you still need to register just the same).