The fact that even the most highly evolved nonhuman mammals can’t use language to communicate with us about their subjective mental experience is only the first layer of additional complication in trying to extend our reasoning about pain and morality to animals. And everything gets progressively more abstract and convolved as we move farther and farther out from the higher-type mammals into cattle and swine and dogs and cats and rodents, and then birds and fish, and finally invertebrates like lobsters.
I had tremendous difficulty navigating to read this. For whatever reason I could only visit page 1 and 10, so I wasn’t able to form any assessment of the article you posted.
So it is without that background or knowing exactly where you stand that I offer:
The lack of a commonly understood mechanism that can be used to communicate about pain with a lobster doesn’t mean that lobsters are incapable of feeling pain any more than it means that humans are incapable of feeling pain because we can’t talk to lobsters about it.
This applies to any other creature.
The lack of a common language doesn’t hold water as an argument that experiences can’t be shared.
It may be that you and I agree with this, or not, but it is difficult without having read the article.
It's a pretty well known essay--you should be able to find out in PDF format pretty easily by googling. It's very much on the non-lobster-eating side and touches on both physiological and philosophical arguments.
Consider the lobster