That we have consciousness as some kind of special property, and it's not just an artifact of our brain basic lower-level calculations, is also not very convincing to begin with.

In a trivial sense, any special property can be incorporated into a more comprehensive rule set, which one may choose to call "physics" is one so desires; but that's just Hempel's dilemma.

To object more directly, I would say that people who call the hard problem of consciousness hard would disagree with your statement.

People who call "the hard problem of consciousness hard" use circular logic (notice the two "hards" in the phrase).

People who merely call "the problem of consciousness hard" don't have some special mechanism to justify that over what we know, which is as emergent property of meat-algorithmic calcuations.

Except Penrose, who hand-waves some special physics.

Luckily there are a fair number of people that reject the hard problem as an artifact of running a simulation on a chemical meat computer.

You'd be hard pressed to convince me, for example, a police dog has morals. The bar is much higher than consciousness.