> (It obviously doesn't work for e.g. drugs, the amount that patents contribute to drug prices is far in excess of 5%.)
For one thing, it's arguable that the amount that patents contribute to drug prices, and to drugmakers' revenues, is too damn high. Secondly, the basic scheme is obviously compatible with setting a higher percentage of sale price in the case of drugs. Alternatively, about 10 or 15 years ago some lawyers proposed a kind of mandatory Dutch-auction scheme for drug patents, which seemed interesting.
> world+dog would still have the incentive to file for a million low-quality patents because having a patent gets you a share and nobody can afford to look too closely at whether you deserve one.
The nice thing about this is that it would be somewhat of a self-resolving problem, since it would give the holders of non-trivial patents reason to lobby for high standards for patentability.
> The nice thing about this is that it would be somewhat of a self-resolving problem, since it would give the holders of non-trivial patents reason to lobby for high standards for patentability.
It would also give the holders of trivial patents (and patent lawyers who want more business) reason to lobby for low standards for patentability.
No, the trivial-patent holders already have that incentive. In any case, in a direct lobbying/political conflict between IBM, GSK, Dow Chemical and whoever versus pure-play trolls, even big ones like IV, my money is on the former. The way in which a fixed levy would or could facilitate trivial-patent holders is by putting in place a revenue-collecting process (making claims on the 5% pool) which might (or might not) be smoother and more reliable than the process by which these gentlemen make their money nowadays.
For one thing, it's arguable that the amount that patents contribute to drug prices, and to drugmakers' revenues, is too damn high. Secondly, the basic scheme is obviously compatible with setting a higher percentage of sale price in the case of drugs. Alternatively, about 10 or 15 years ago some lawyers proposed a kind of mandatory Dutch-auction scheme for drug patents, which seemed interesting.
> world+dog would still have the incentive to file for a million low-quality patents because having a patent gets you a share and nobody can afford to look too closely at whether you deserve one.
The nice thing about this is that it would be somewhat of a self-resolving problem, since it would give the holders of non-trivial patents reason to lobby for high standards for patentability.